Suchergebnisse

Im Zuge der Corona Krise werden europäische Gemeinschaftsanleihen zur Unterstützung von besonders betroffenen Mitgliedsländern intensiv diskutiert. Die Autoren zeigen, dass Gemeinschaftsanleihen europäischer Staaten keine Neuigkeit wären. Seit den 1970er Jahren hat die Europäische Kommission wiederholt Anleihen auf dem privaten Kapitalmarkt ausgegeben, die durch die Mitgliedsländer garantiert und an Krisenländer ausgeschüttet wurden. "Coronabonds", wie derzeit diskutiert, stünden in einer langen Tradition. Die erste Gemeinschaftsanleihe wurde 1976 zu Gunsten Italiens und Irlands emittiert, in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren folgten weitere Anleihen für Frankreich, Griechenland und Portugal, sowie, nach 2008, für Ungarn, Lettland und Rumänien. Zusätzlich wurde 2012 der ESM für Eurozonen-Länder etabliert. Aus der Geschichte kann somit die Lehre gezogen werden, dass die europäischen Regierungen in tiefen Krisen immer wieder bereit waren gemeinschaftliche Anleihen auszugeben und dafür zu haften, wenn auch nur für begrenzte Zeit. Die dafür notwendigen Institutionen wurden flexibel und kurzfristig entwickelt. Eine zweite Lehre ist, dass der EU Haushalt seit den 70er Jahren wiederholt genutzt wurde, um die Rückzahlung der Anleihen zu garantieren. Es ist kein Zufall, dass derzeit auch wieder vorgeschlagen wird "Coronabonds" über einen deutlich erweiterten EU Haushalt zu bedienen. ; The history of joint European bond issuance has been largely forgotten. The authors show that bonds issued and guaranteed jointly by European states are not a novel instrument, but have repeatedly been issued since the 1970s. The issuance of one-off "Coronabonds", as currently proposed, would not be unprecedented, but quite the contrary. The first European community bond was issued in 1976 to mitigate the adverse impact of the oil crisis, which threatened the viability of the European Economic Union. The funds were raised on private capital markets and then passed on to crisis countries, including Italy and Ireland. In the 1980s and 1990s community bonds were issued in favor of France, Greece and Portugal and, in 2008/2009, to support the non-Eurozone countries Hungary, Latvia and Romania. Moreover, the EFSF and ESM facilities were created after 2010 to support Eurozone members. The most important lesson from history is that, during deep crises, the European governments have repeatedly shown willingness to extend rescue funds along with substantial guarantees to other members in need. The necessary institutional arrangements were often set up flexibly and quickly. A second lesson is that the EU budget played a central role in past European bond guarantee schemes. Direct guarantees via country quotas were only the second guarantee tier, in case EU funds did not suffice, and only until 1981. Not coincidentally, the repayment of "Coronabonds" through an enlarged future EU budget is currently being discussed.

The history of joint European bond issuance has been largely forgotten. The authors show that bonds issued and guaranteed jointly by European states are not a novel instrument, but have repeatedly been issued since the 1970s. The issuance of one-off "Coronabonds", as currently proposed, would not be unprecedented, but quite the contrary. The first European community bond was issued in 1976 to mitigate the adverse impact of the oil crisis, which threatened the viability of the European Economic Union. The funds were raised on private capital markets and then passed on to crisis countries, including Italy and Ireland. In the 1980s and 1990s community bonds were issued in favor of France, Greece and Portugal and, in 2008/2009, to support the non-Eurozone countries Hungary, Latvia and Romania. Moreover, the EFSF and ESM facilities were created after 2010 to support Eurozone members. The most important lesson from history is that, during deep crises, the European governments have repeatedly shown willingness to extend rescue funds along with substantial guarantees to other members in need. The necessary institutional arrangements were often set up flexibly and quickly. A second lesson is that the EU budget played a central role in past European bond guarantee schemes. Direct guarantees via country quotas were only the second guarantee tier, in case EU funds did not suffice, and only until 1981. Not coincidentally, the repayment of "Coronabonds" through an enlarged future EU budget is currently being discussed. ; Im Zuge der Corona Krise werden europäische Gemeinschaftsanleihen zur Unterstützung von besonders betroffenen Mitgliedsländern intensiv diskutiert. Die Autoren zeigen, dass Gemeinschaftsanleihen europäischer Staaten keine Neuigkeit wären. Seit den 1970er Jahren hat die Europäische Kommission wiederholt Anleihen auf dem privaten Kapitalmarkt ausgegeben, die durch die Mitgliedsländer garantiert und an Krisenländer ausgeschüttet wurden. "Coronabonds", wie derzeit diskutiert, stünden in einer langen Tradition. Die erste Gemeinschaftsanleihe wurde 1976 zu Gunsten Italiens und Irlands emittiert, in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren folgten weitere Anleihen für Frankreich, Griechenland und Portugal, sowie, nach 2008, für Ungarn, Lettland und Rumänien. Zusätzlich wurde 2012 der ESM für Eurozonen-Länder etabliert. Aus der Geschichte kann somit die Lehre gezogen werden, dass die europäischen Regierungen in tiefen Krisen immer wieder bereit waren gemeinschaftliche Anleihen auszugeben und dafür zu haften, wenn auch nur für begrenzte Zeit. Die dafür notwendigen Institutionen wurden flexibel und kurzfristig entwickelt. Eine zweite Lehre ist, dass der EU Haushalt seit den 70er Jahren wiederholt genutzt wurde, um die Rückzahlung der Anleihen zu garantieren. Es ist kein Zufall, dass derzeit auch wieder vorgeschlagen wird "Coronabonds" über einen deutlich erweiterten EU Haushalt zu bedienen.

Official ending is much larger than commonly known, often surpassing total private cross-border capital flows, especially during wars, financial crises and natural catastrophes. This paper assembles the first comprehensive long-run dataset of official international loans, covering 230,000 loans, grants and guarantees extended by governments, central banks, and multilateral institutions in the period 1790–2015. Historically, wars have been the main catalyst of government-to-government lending. The scale of official credits granted in and around WW1 and WW2 was particularly large, easily surpassing the scale of total international bailout lending after the 2008 crash. During peacetime, development finance and financial crises are the main drivers of official cross-border finance, with official flows often stepping in when private flows retrench. In line with predictions of recent theoretical contributions, this paper finds that official lending increases with the degree of economic integration. In financial crises, governments help those countries to which they have greater trade and banking exposure, hoping to reduce the collateral damage to their own economies. Since the 2000s, official finance has made a sharp comeback, largely due to the rise of China as an international creditor and the return of central bank cross-border lending in times of stress, this time through swap lines.

Official (government-to-government) lending is much larger than commonly known, often surpassing total private cross-border capital flows, especially during disasters such as wars, financial crises and natural catastrophes. We assemble the first comprehensive long-run dataset of official international lending, covering 230,000 loans, grants and guarantees extended by governments, central banks, and multilateral institutions in the period 1790-2015. Historically, wars have been the main catalyst of government-to-government transfers. The scale of official credits granted in and around WW1 and WW2 was particularly large, easily surpassing the scale of total international bailout lending after the 2008 crash. During peacetime, development finance and financial crises are the main drivers of official cross-border finance, with official flows often stepping in when private flows retrench. In line with the predictions of recent theoretical contributions, we find that official lending increases with the degree of economic integration. In crises and disasters, governments help those countries to which they have greater trade and banking exposure, hoping to reduce the collateral damage to their own economies. Since the 2000s, official finance has made a sharp comeback, largely due to the rise of China as an international creditor and the return of central bank cross-border lending in times of stress, this time in the form of swap lines.

Official (government-to-government) lending is much larger than commonly known, often surpassing total private cross-border capital flows, especially during disasters such as wars, financial crises and natural catastrophes. We assemble the first comprehensive long-run dataset of official international lending, covering 230,000 loans, grants and guarantees extended by governments, central banks, and multilateral institutions in the period 1790-2015. Historically, wars have been the main catalyst of government-to-government transfers. The scale of official credits granted in and around WW1 and WW2 was particularly large, easily surpassing the scale of total international bailout lending after the 2008 crash. During peacetime, development finance and financial crises are the main drivers of official crossborder finance, with official flows often stepping in when private flows retrench. In line with the predictions of recent theoretical contributions, we find that official lending increases with the degree of economic integration. In crises and disasters, governments help those countries to which they have greater trade and banking exposure, hoping to reduce the collateral damage to their own economies. Since the 2000s, official finance has made a sharp comeback, largely due to the rise of China as an international creditor and the return of central bank cross-border lending in times of stress, this time in the form of swap lines. ; Not Reviewed

Official (government-to-government) lending is much larger than commonly known, often surpassing total private cross-border capital flows, especially during disasters such as wars, financial crises and natural catastrophes. We assemble the first comprehensive long-run dataset of official international lending, covering 230,000 loans, grants and guarantees extended by governments, central banks, and multilateral institutions in the period 1790-2015. Historically, wars have been the main catalyst of government-to-government transfers. The scale of official credits granted in and around WW1 and WW2 was particularly large, easily surpassing the scale of total international bailout lending after the 2008 crash. During peacetime, development finance and financial crises are the main drivers of official crossborder finance, with official flows often stepping in when private flows retrench. In line with the predictions of recent theoretical contributions, we find that official lending increases with the degree of economic integration. In crises and disasters, governments help those countries to which they have greater trade and banking exposure, hoping to reduce the collateral damage to their own economies. Since the 2000s, official finance has made a sharp comeback, largely due to the rise of China as an international creditor and the return of central bank cross-border lending in times of stress, this time in the form of swap lines.

Abstract
China is the world's largest official creditor, but we lack basic facts about the terms and conditions of its lending. Very few contracts between Chinese lenders and their government borrowers have ever been published or studied. This paper is the first systematic analysis of the legal terms of China's foreign lending. We collect and analyse 100 contracts between Chinese state-owned entities and government borrowers in 24 developing countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Oceania, and compare them with those of other bilateral, multilateral and commercial creditors. Three main insights emerge. First, the Chinese contracts contain unusual confidentiality clauses that bar borrowers from revealing the terms or even the existence of the debt. Second, Chinese lenders seek advantage over other creditors, using collateral arrangements such as lender-controlled revenue accounts and promises to keep the debt out of collective restructuring ('no Paris Club' clauses). Third, cancellation, acceleration and stabilization clauses in Chinese contracts potentially allow the lenders to influence debtors' domestic and foreign policies. Even if these terms were unenforceable in court, the mix of confidentiality, seniority and policy influence could limit the sovereign debtor's crisis management options and complicate debt renegotiation. Overall, the contracts use creative design to manage credit risks and overcome enforcement hurdles, presenting China as a muscular and commercially savvy lender to the developing world.